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Abstract 
Weather index insurance is a potential solution to a widely acknowledged problem of 
information asymmetries in agricultural crop insurance. Insurance where payouts depend on a 
weather index relies on accurate estimates of local weather, such as temperature and rainfall. 
Using a geostatistical kriging method and empirical weather and crop yield data from Illinois, 
I explore whether accounting for geographic approximation errors produces more desirable 
index insurance contracts. I find that switching to this so-called geographic basis risk-adjusted 
contract improves farmers’ utility for one of our two indices, but not for the other. Further, 
purchasing any index insurance contract only improves farmers’ utility during a particularly 
hot year. During a cooler year, purchasing WI insurance results in lower utility for risk neutral 
farmer, and constant utility for risk averse farmers.  
v 
Sammanfattning 
Jordbruksförsäkring baserat på ett underliggande väderindex, t.ex. temperatur eller nederbörd 
är en potentiel lösning på ett uppmärksammat problem med informationsassymetrier i 
försäkringsbranschen. Dessa så kallade väderindexkontrakt bygger på att förluster i jordbruket 
med viss säkerhet kan kopplas till extrema väderförhållanden. I denna uppsats använder jag 
kriging, en geostatistisk metod för prediktion av spatial data, för att beräkna variansen som 
beror på avstånd mellan punkt där temperaturen skall estimeras och väderstationer från vilka 
temperaturdata hämtas. Jag undersöker hur temperaturindexförsäkring kan förbättras genom att 
ta hänsyn till denna varians och finner att dessa s.k. basriskjusterade kontrakt presterar bättre 
när ett vanligt temperaturindex används. Indexförsäkring gynnar dock enligt mina beräkningar 
bara lantbrukare under ovanligt varma år. Under svalare år missgynnas riskneutrala bönder av 
att köpa indexförsäkring, medan riskaversa bönder är mer ambivalenta.  
vi 
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1 Introduction 
“There cannot be more people on this earth than can be fed” 
- Attenborough, D
This thesis aims to extend and build on recent work on weather index insurance in agriculture 
and sets out to answer the research question: Does accounting for geographic basis risk improve 
the market for weather index insurance contracts in Illinois corn production? Here I add to the 
existing literature by showing how contracts can be designed by using kriging interpolation to 
construct both weather indices and estimates of geographic basis risk.  
1.1 Problem background 
Climate change brings considerable uncertainty surrounding the future productivity of 
agricultural land. As ever-increasing amounts of greenhouse gases accumulate in the Earth’s 
atmosphere, an on average warming planet poses challenges for a number of species and 
ecosystems, notably those of crops on which we depend for sustenance. As the Earth is already 
committed to further decades of warming even with abatement in greenhouse gas emissions 
(Meehl et al. 2005; Solomon et al. 2009), maintaining future crop yields under a changing 
climate is therefore important to ensure food security for coming generations.  A growing body 
of research has narrowed in on the economic impact of climate change for the agricultural 
industry, and the conclusions vary. An early, controversial paper (Mendelsohn et al. 1994) finds 
that higher temperatures in all seasons excluding autumn reduce average farm values in the 
United States, while rain outside of autumn increases farm values. Cline (1996) argues that 
these estimates understate the costs of climate change by failing to acknowledge the possibility 
of higher irrigation costs, reductions in global food security and more severe warming. More 
recent work by Schlenker et al. (2005) conclude that for dryland areas the impact of a 3.8°C 
mean increase in temperatures across the US would be unambiguously negative. The estimated 
annual loss is $5 to $5.3 billion, which represented 3.7% of total US crop values in 2018 (USDA 
2019). 
These projections emphasize farmers’ need for efficient protection against weather-related 
damages and climate risk. Traditional crop insurance schemes are widespread but suffer from 
a number of problems: Insurance specifically against weather damage have historically been 
rare and commonly bundled up with protection against a host of other damages in multiple peril 
contracts (Knight et al. 1997). Second, traditional crop insurance suffers from moral hazard as 
insured farmers may invest less in risk-reducing production inputs (Nelson and Loehman 1987). 
Recent work on soybean and corn yields in the United States suggests that crop insurance is 
associated with a 43% and a 67% increase in heat sensitivity, respectively (Annan and 
Schlenker 2015). Finally, traditional crop insurance requires monitoring by the insurer which 
can be costly, particularly in developing countries.  
Index insurance is an alternative to traditional indemnity insurance (Barnett et al. 2008) where 
payoffs to policy-holders are not based on a physical loss assessment on the farm, but on an 
index that is related to crop production, such as temperature or rainfall. Farmers are indemnified 
whenever the weather index falls outside a given strike level, say above a given CDD.  
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Index insurance deals effectively with moral hazard because the index is taken to be exogenous. 
As index insurance offers important advantages such as i) symmetrical information, ii) lower 
transaction costs and iii) a solution to the moral hazard problem, designing competitive 
contracts that adequately account for basis risk would be valuable (Vroege et al. 2019).  
1.2 Problem statement 
The most cited obstacle to greater uptake of index insurance is so-called basis risk, i.e. that 
yields are not perfectly correlated with the index so that an insured farmer may suffer yield 
losses and receive no compensation (Conradt et al. 2015). There are three major kinds of basis 
risk: Local, product, and geographic basis risk. Local basis risk refers to the degree to which a 
particular weather derivative is an imperfect hedge against shortfalls for a given exposure, 
where the underlying index on the weather derivative and the exposure being hedged 
correspond to the same geographic location. In other words, the index reflects local weather 
conditions, but does not accurately hedge against weather risk because there is an imperfect 
link between the index and crop yields. Second, product risk is the difference in hedging 
effectiveness between alternative hedging instruments, for example a precipitation and 
temperature index. Finally, geographic basis risk refers to the error associated with employing 
a non-local weather derivative. For example, a weather index may be constructed from ground 
level climate station data measured some distance from the farm. While geographic basis risk 
is defined in terms of a particular site, it is possible for location indices to also be specified as 
a weighted set of locations, such as interpolations of a sample of station data points onto a 
continuous grid representing agricultural area (Woodard and Garcia 2008). This thesis will 
focus specifically on geographic basis risk, which I will estimate using a geostatistical kriging 
model.  
1.3 Aim and delimitations 
The purpose of this thesis is to a) construct two index insurance contracts against extreme heat 
using so-called kriging interpolation, and b) explore the welfare effects of switching from a 
regular index contract to one which account for geographic basis risk. Specifically, I test the 
hypothesis that variance due to geographic basis risk obscures the effect size of extreme 
temperatures on crop yields, leading to less efficient insurance contracts.  
The scope of the thesis is limited geographically to the state of Illinois in the United States. 
While index insurance contracts can theoretically be created for any crop, I choose to focus 
only on corn production. These choices are motivated on the grounds that Illinois is one of the 
most important states for agriculture in the US, and corn farming is not only significant but also 
evenly and continuously distributed across the state. This ensures that the entire sample of 
weather stations is useful. Further, Annan and Schlenker (2015) have already shown that 
traditional crop insurance provides disincentives to adapt to extreme heat among Illinois corn 
and soybean farmers. Their results therefore motivate particular study of weather index 
insurance in this context. Due to time limitations, no other crops or states were studied. As such, 
the thesis cannot confirm whether the results remain robust across different climate zones and 
crops.   
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1.4 Structure of the report 
The main part of the thesis begins with chapter 2 on theoretical perspectives and the relevant 
literature. Chapter 2 itself is split into two parts: First are subchapters 2.1 and 2.2 on the theory 
of insurance. The theoretical framework of weather index insurance is built upon older research 
on traditional indemnity crop insurance. This begins with the basics of risk and risk aversion, 
and the theory of indemnity insurance contract design. It presents the key results of risk attitudes 
beginning with von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) and Arrow (1971) and covers key papers 
on crop insurance including Ahsan et al. (1982), Nelson and Loehman (1987) and Chambers 
(1989). These are followed in 2.3 by the theory of weather index insurance. Key papers include 
Conradt et al. (2015) and Dalhaus (2018). I explain how a weather index insurance contract is 
designed and how the payout mechanism works. Third is a subchapter (2.4) on geographic basis 
risk, and finally 2.5 on the theory of kriging interpolation. Kriging is the geostatistical method 
we use to interpolate temperature data from a sample of weather stations onto a grid of the state 
of Illinois. The kriging model is fitted using what is known as the variogram method, which I 
also explain further.  
Chapter 3 describes the data such as the sample of weather stations and the corn yield data. I 
also explain how our data is mapped geographically. I cover the basics of mapping and 
specifically how the grid of Illinois is projected. In chapter 4 I show how CDD indices are 
constructed and how the contracts are designed. I motivate our choices of model selection and 
cross-validation and explain how the main hypothesis is tested. In chapter 5 I present the 
analysis and discuss the results. These include the construction of two different index insurance 
contracts, where the first is a ‘regular’ contract and the second is a geographic basis risk-
adjusted contract. The analysis is built upon theory described in chapter 2. I present the payoffs 
to farmers and the insurer for each insurance option and test the geographic basis risk 
hypothesis. The following discussion also comments on weaknesses and possible 
improvements in the study design. Finally, chapter 6 concludes the thesis and summarizes the 
key lessons.  
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𝑈(𝑤) exist and are finite. 
2 Theory and literature review 
“If people don’t believe math is simple, it’s only because they don’t realize 
how complicated the world is” 
- von Neumann, J
2.1 Risk and risk aversion 
Quite simply, the purpose of an insurance contract is to offer the buyer protection against risk. 
I begin this section by briefly presenting the formal theory of modelling risk. Imagine that you 
have some initial wealth 𝑤0 and you are being offered to bet $10 on a fair coin toss. If the coin
comes up heads, you will win $10. If it comes up tails, you lose $10. Would you take the bet?  
(2.1) 
In playing this simple coin toss game, your expected terminal wealth is zero, equivalent to not 
playing at all. Recall that a rational agent maximizes utility as a function of wealth, where the 
marginal utility of wealth is strictly positive. Let us move now from a simple coin toss with two 
possible outcomes to a lottery with N possible uncertain outcomes, each associated with a given 
probability ρ. In a classic result, von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953) show that traditional 
utility theory can be simply extended to uncertain outcomes.  
The expected utility theorem: Formally, the utility function U: ℒ → ℝ has an expected utility 
form if there is an assignment of utilities {𝑢1, 𝑢2, … , 𝑢𝑁} to N outcomes such that for every
lottery 𝐿 = {𝜌1, 𝜌2, … , 𝜌𝑁} ∈ ℒ we have 𝑈(𝐿) = 𝜌1𝑢1 + 𝜌2𝑢2 + ⋯ + 𝜌𝑁𝑢𝑁. When choosing
between two different lotteries L and L´, a rational individual has the preferences 𝐿 ≿ 𝐿´ if and 
only if ∑ 𝑢𝑛𝜌𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=1 ≥ ∑ 𝑢𝑛𝜌´𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=1 . (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1947)
1
A utility function U: ℒ → ℝ with the expected utility form is known as a von Neumann-
Morgenstern (v.N-M) expected utility function. The v.N-M expected utility function can be 
interpreted as the weighted sum of all possible outcomes in a lottery by their respective 
probabilities. (Mas-Colell et al. 1995) The shape of an individual’s v.N-M utility function 
depends on their risk preferences. Consider again betting on tossing a fair coin with an expected 
terminal wealth of zero. An individual who is indifferent between taking the bet and not is 
considered risk neutral. By the expected utility hypothesis, we formally represent their 
preferences as follows: 
(2.2) 
where again 𝑤0 is initial wealth and ℎ is size of the bet. Similarly, an individual is considered 
risk averse if in equation 2.2 L.H.S. > R.H.S. and risk seeking if L.H.S. < R.H.S. When making 
assumptions about risk attitudes, we consider a) that wealth is always desirable so that the 
marginal utility of wealth is strictly positive 𝑈′(𝑤) > 0 and b) that if 𝑈(𝑤) is strictly increasing 
in 𝑤 the statement that it is bounded can be written, 
 
1 For a critique of expected utility theory, see e.g. Allais (1953) and Kahneman and Tversky (1979). 
5 
𝛼𝐴(𝑤) = −𝑈′′(𝑤) 𝑈′(𝑤)⁄
𝑈(𝑤) =
𝑤1−𝛼 − 1
1 − 𝛼
𝐸(𝑤) = 𝑃 ∑ 𝜌𝑖𝑌(𝑋, 𝜃𝑖) − 𝐶(𝑋, 𝜔)
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝐸(𝑤) = 𝑌 − 𝜌𝐷 
The boundedness condition implies that for some positive number ε, no matter how small, we 
must have 𝑈′(𝑤) < 𝜀 for all but a set of intervals on 𝑤 whose total length is finite. This means
that 𝑈(𝑤) is concave so that 𝑈′(𝑤) is strictly decreasing as 𝑤 increases. Hence, with relatively
rare exceptions 𝑈′′(𝑤) < 0. This shows that individuals are generally risk averse (See
Appendix 1 for further reasoning). Indeed, prevalence of risk aversion can be inferred from 
economic observation. In a world of only risk neutral or risk seeking individuals, there would 
be no demand for fair insurance where expected utility is unchanging. (Arrow 1971) 
(2.3) 
Equation 2.3 shows the measure of absolute risk aversion, which represents the compensation 
required for taking risks, i.e. how much higher the potential upside in the coin bet must be for 
a risk averse individual to want to play. By multiplying equation 2.3 with terminal wealth 𝑤 we 
derive the measure of relative risk aversion 𝛼𝑅(𝑤) which is the elasticity of the marginal utility 
of wealth. For the purposes of this thesis I will use an isoelastic utility function displaying 
constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) and decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) which 
has empirical support in the relevant literature (Di Falco and Chavas 2009; Dalhaus et al. 2019): 
(2.4) 
where a condition for DARA is that 𝑈′′′(𝑤) > 0.2 Specifically, for equation 2.4 𝑈′′′(𝑤) =
(𝛼2 + 𝛼)𝑤−𝛼−2 > 0 for α ∈ ℝ | α > 0 (Adams and Essex 2014).
2.2 Indemnity crop insurance 
We turn now to the theory of crop insurance. The risk averse farmer aspires to maximize their 
expected utility given by equation 2.4 as a function of terminal wealth 𝑤 and a given level of 
risk aversion α. Terminal wealth is a function of crop yield which varies from year to year 
depending on some state of nature θ each associated with a probability ρ. The farmer’s expected 
terminal wealth can be represented as: 
   (2.5) 
The price P is exogenously given (for simplicity we set it equal to 1) and ∑ 𝜌𝑖 = 1. The cost C
is a function of inputs and input prices, but since it only factors into insurance decisions when 
we consider a choice between risky and risk-reducing inputs (Nelson and Loehman 1987) it is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. To simplify further we can separate the yield distribution into 
a constant optimal yield minus damages occurring with probability ρ. When we consider 
terminal wealth purely in terms of yield we get: 
(2.6) 
2 The proof is left as an exercise for the reader. Solution in Levy (1994). 
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max
𝛼≥0
 (1 − 𝜌)𝑈(𝑌 − 𝛼𝜑) + 𝜌𝑈(𝑌 − 𝛼𝜑 − 𝐷 + 𝛼) 
𝑈′(𝑌 − 𝐷 + 𝛼∗(1 − 𝜌)) − 𝑈′(𝑌 − 𝛼∗𝜌) ≤ 0
𝛼∗ = 𝐷
𝑌 − 𝐷 + 𝛼∗(1 − 𝜌) = 𝑌 − 𝛼∗𝜌
Now imagine that the farmer can purchase insurance at a price φ per unit which pays one yield 
unit if damages occur. If the farmer buys α units of insurance, his expected terminal wealth will 
now be 𝑌 − 𝜌𝐷 + 𝛼(𝜌 − 𝜑). Following equation 2.2 the farmer’s utility maximization problem 
in choosing α is therefore: 
(2.7) 
We differentiate equation 2.7 with respect to α. If 𝛼∗ is an optimum, it must satisfy the first-
order condition: 
(2.8) 
Suppose that the premium φ of one unit of insurance is actuarially fair, which means that it is 
equal to the expected payout of the insurance, ρ. Such a premium implies a non-profit insurance 
provider, which is realistic given a public crop insurance model, and absence of moral hazard, 
adverse selection, and transaction costs, which is less realistic. (Mas-Colell et al. 1995)  
For 𝜑 = 𝜌 the first-order condition requires that 
(2.9) 
In chapter 2.1 we showed that 𝑈′′(𝑤) < 0 and so it follows that 𝑈′(𝑌 − 𝐷) > 𝑈′(𝑌). From
there it also follows from equation 2.9 that 𝛼∗ > 0. We rearrange equation 2.9 and because
𝑈′(𝑤) is strictly decreasing, we can reduce it to 
  (2.10) 
(2.11) 
Deriving equation 2.11 reveals an important result. With a fair premium, the risk averse farmer 
will insure completely and buy insurance to cover all damages. This extends similar results in 
the standard insurance literature (Arrow 1971; Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976; Raviv 1979) to 
agricultural crop insurance. However, Ahsan et al. (1982) shows that when insurers cannot 
distinguish between high-risk and low-risk farmers, market failure will occur, and this result 
does not hold.  
Absence of competitive insurance markets can largely be explained through information 
asymmetries, the authors argue. Further, Chambers (1989) shows that since damages across 
farms are highly covariate, the insurer stands to suffer large losses simultaneously. Finally, 
Annan and Schlenker (2015) show empirically how insured farmers have less incentive to adapt 
to damage from extreme heat. All of this indicate that insurers may need to set higher premiums 
than what is actuarially fair. In the upcoming section I will explore how weather index contracts 
deals with these problems in insuring against weather damages.  
−𝜑(1 − 𝜌)𝑈′(𝑌 − 𝛼∗𝜑) + 𝜌(1 − 𝜑)𝑈′(𝑌 − 𝐷 + 𝛼∗(1 − 𝜑)) ≤ 0
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𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝑔𝑖(𝑊𝐼𝑖𝑡) + 𝜀
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = ℎ𝑖(𝑊𝐼𝑖𝑡) + 𝜗 + 𝜀
𝑆 = 𝑔𝑖
−1(?̅?)
2.3 Weather index insurance 
Weather index insurance is an alternative to traditional indemnity insurance (Barnett et al. 
2008) where payoffs to policy-holders are not based on a physical loss assessment on the farm, 
but on an index that is related to crop production, such as air temperature or rainfall. Weather 
is exogenously given and cannot be influenced by farmers. Further, historical weather data is 
public information. Because of this, with weather index (WI) insurance there are no information 
asymmetries and opportunities for moral hazard. These qualities have attracted further research 
into WI insurance in recent years (Nadolnyak and Vedenov 2013; Conradt 2015; Dalhaus 
2018). In this section I will show in some detail how WI insurance contracts are designed and 
discuss their weaknesses.  
WI insurance theory rests on the empirical fact that crop yields are correlated with the weather. 
A common index in WI research is rainfall, where e.g. Conradt et al. (2015) and Dalhaus (2018) 
use average rainfall over the growing season. Rainfall has been shown to be negatively 
correlated with crop yield for very low and very high values, and positively correlated in 
between (Lobell et al. 2007). Here I will focus on WI insurance against extreme heat, as the 
results of Annan and Schlenker (2015) indicate a need for protection without moral hazard. A 
farmer who buys a heat index contract receives payout not as a function of damages as in 
indemnity insurance. Instead, payouts occur whenever the heat index goes above a certain 
temperature limit, known as the strike level S. The strike level depends on the sensitivity of 
crop yields to extreme heat, and it is determined as follows: 
Following from Conradt et al. (2015) and Dalhaus (2018) assume crop yield 𝑌𝑖𝑡 of farmer 𝑖 in 
year 𝑡 to be a function 𝑔𝑖(𝑊𝐼𝑖𝑡) of the weather index. Crop yield can be estimated using the 
linear model 
(2.12) 
where ε is a bundle of all contributors to yield variations that are uncorrelated with weather. 
These include production inputs, soil characteristics and pests. In a perfect world ε would not 
include any weather-related losses as they would all be captured by 𝑔𝑖(𝑊𝐼𝑖𝑡). In reality, 
𝑔𝑖(𝑊𝐼𝑖𝑡) can only be approximated by an estimate ℎ𝑖(𝑊𝐼𝑖𝑡) which comes with its own error 
term ϑ which captures basis risk. The final regression model is therefore 
(2.13) 
By basis risk ϑ we mean error in ℎ𝑖(𝑊𝐼𝑖𝑡) due to how we approximate local weather from non-
local weather station data. WI insurance depends on the idea that weather indices correlate with 
crop yields, and the strike level S is set such that unless the weather index falls outside this 
level, the farmer can expect average yield that year. The strike level is given by 
(2.14) 
where the average yield over previous years are plugged into the inverse of the regression 
model. In other words, S is maximum value the index can reach while maintaining average 
yields. (Dalhaus 2018) When the index exceeds the strike level, payout to the insured farmer is 
determined based on the difference between the index and the strike level, as well as the effect 
size of the index on yield. This ensures that the size of the payout will be proportional to the 
damages associated with a given level of heat.  
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𝛿𝑖𝑡 = Τ𝑖𝑡 ∗ max{0, 𝑆𝑖𝑡 − 𝑊𝐼𝑖𝑡} (2.15) 
where Τ𝑖𝑡is the regression coefficient, known as the tick size, which describes how yield varies 
with one unit change in temperature. Just like with traditional indemnity insurance, assume a 
non-profit, risk neutral insurance provider that set the premium φ equal to expected payout. The 
farmer’s decision problem therefore ultimately the same as with indemnity insurance. He 
chooses insurance so as to maximize expected utility as a function of terminal wealth 
(2.16) 
The biggest obstacle to attractive WI insurance is basis risk. When the weather index fails to 
accurately predict crop yields, insured farmers may not be compensated. If damages occur but 
the index does not exceed the strike level, payouts will be zero. Similarly, a WI contract will 
pay out whenever the index exceeds the strike level even in the absence of damages. (Vroege 
et al. 2019; Dalhaus 2018) In the next sections I will cover geographic basis risk and how 
kriging interpolation can be used to measure it. 
2.4 Geographic basis risk 
As I have discussed in the previous section, weather index insurance payouts depend on the 
realization of a weather index, such as precipitation or temperature. Naturally, crop yields at a 
given farm are assumed to be realized weather at the farm location, which is at best similar to 
weather elsewhere. The potential for differences between weather at the farm itself and nearby 
weather stations is known as geographic basis risk. Put simply, geographic basis risk is the 
additional risk that arises by using a non-local contract. Geographic basis risk is defined in 
Woodard and Garcia (2008) in terms of a particular site, but it is possible for weather indices 
to be specified in terms of a weighted set of different locations.  
When geographic basis risk was measured as the difference in hedging effectiveness between 
local and non-local derivatives, Woodard and Garcia (2008) find that the hedging effectiveness 
was about 8% better when hedging with a non-local average index derivative relative to the 
implied hedging effectiveness of a derivative written on an average index of the local indexes. 
They sampled temperature data from one ‘central’ weather station in each of nine crop reporting 
districts in Illinois, as well as six cities. The authors suspect that the reason for this result is that 
aggregating the hedging instruments across such a large geographic area results in a portfolio 
that has a very high systemic component, which can be associated with production shortfalls, 
relative to idiosyncratic component.  Since the non-local cities are spread out over a larger 
geographic area than the local weather stations, the idiosyncratic components are more 
diversified in the case of the cities. At the state level, the estimated basis risk was 5,97% of the 
Root Mean Square Loss. (Woodard and Garcia 2008) 
When designing a WI insurance contract, the underlying index is supposed to reflect local 
weather conditions at the farm, but in practice we only have a sample of weather stations. This 
means that we will need to estimate local weather from my sampled locations, as well as 
magnify the size of geographic basis risk. It turns out that kriging interpolation, which is 
covered in the next section, comes to our aid in both respects. 
𝑤 = 𝑌 − 𝐷 − 𝜑 + 𝛿 + 𝑤0 
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𝛾(ℎ) =
1
2|𝑁(ℎ)|
∑ (𝑧𝑖 − 𝑧𝑗)
2
𝑁(ℎ)
Figure 2-1 Sample variogram 
2.5 The theory of kriging 
Ordinary kriging, also known as Weiner-Kolmogorov prediction, is a commonly used method 
for interpolation of spatial data. Interpolation is a process where a range of values is 
approximated from a sample of data points. A spatial interpolation method exploits spatial 
patterns in the sample to “fill in the gaps” in some field, or geographic region in the 2D case. 
In geostatistical models, sampled data is interpreted as the result of a random process 𝑍(𝒔). The 
fact that these models incorporate uncertainty in their framework does not mean that the 
phenomenon – the forest, the farmland or mine etc. – has resulted from a random process, but 
rather it allows the researcher to build a methodological basis for the spatial inference of 
quantities in unobserved locations, and to quantify the uncertainty associated with the estimator. 
(Chiles and Delfiner 1999) 
The unknown value 𝑍(𝒔0) which to estimate is interpreted as a random variable located at 𝒔0 
and the weighted average of values in neighboring locations 𝑍(𝒔𝑖), 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁. Intuitively, we
posit that observations closer to the interpolated point should have higher weights than more 
remote observations. Unlike a simpler method like inverse-distance weighting which calculates 
weights only based on distances, ordinary kriging also accounts for variances between points. 
In practice, the sample variogram method is used, described below: 
The variogram is defined as the variance of the difference between field values at two locations 
𝑖 and 𝑗. Given a sample of observations 𝑍(𝑠𝑖) = 𝑧𝑖 for 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑘 at locations 𝑠 = (𝑥, 𝑦) in 2D
space with coordinates 𝑥 and 𝑦, the sample variogram is given by: 
(2.17) 
where 𝑁(ℎ) is the set of all pairwise Euclidian distances 𝑖 − 𝑗 = ℎ and |𝑁(ℎ)| is the number of 
distinct pairs in 𝑁(ℎ).  
10 
𝛾(ℎ) = {
0,  𝑖𝑓|ℎ| = 0
𝑎 + (𝜎2 − 𝑎) (1 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (
−3|ℎ|
𝑟
)) , 𝑖𝑓|ℎ| > 0
 
𝐶(ℎ) = {
𝑎 + (𝜎2 − 𝑎),  𝑖𝑓|ℎ| = 0
(𝜎2 − 𝑎)𝑒𝑥𝑝 (
−3|ℎ|
𝑟
) ,  𝑖𝑓|ℎ| > 0
Figure 2.1 shows the plot of a sample variogram. It is characterized by some key features: 
Continuity: Most environmental variables are continuous and therefore we should expect γ(h) 
to pass through the origin at h = 0. In practice, however, the variogram often appears to approach 
the y-axis at some positive value as h approaches zero which suggests that the process is 
discontinuous. This discrepancy is known as the nugget variance (see the intercept 0,3 in Figure 
2.1). For properties that vary continuously the nugget variance usually includes some 
measurement error, but mostly comprises variation that occurs over distances less than the 
shortest sampling interval. 
Monotonic increase. Figure 2.1 shows that the variance increases with increasing lag distance. 
This indicates that at short distances the values of the 𝑍(𝒔) are similar, but as the lag distance 
increases they become increasingly dissimilar on average. The monotonic increasing slope 
indicates that the process is spatially dependent. (Chiles and Delfiner 1999) 
Once we calculate an experimental variogram, we can fit it using some of the authorized 
variogram models, such as linear, spherical, exponential or gaussian (Isaaks and Srivastava 
1989; Goovaerts 1997). The variograms are commonly fitted by iterative reweighted least 
squares estimation, where the weights are determined based on the number of point pairs or 
based on the distance. 
Bins. When plotting a sample variogram, the researcher needs to decide on the size of 
increments in the distance h. In figure 2.1 the maximum distance is 800 kilometers, reflecting 
the largest distance between two data points (e.g. stations) in the sample. This distance can be 
split into a number n of incremental chunks, or bins, of length 800 𝑛⁄  kilometers. A larger 
number of relatively small bins means a larger number of points on the variogram because there 
is a larger number of distances between pairs for which variances can be estimated. This makes 
it easier to fit a model such as the exponential to the sample variogram because its shape is 
more visible. However, such a variogram with many bins is less statistically robust because 
with more bins of smaller distance increments their will be fewer location pairs for each 
distance. The researcher should select the number of bins so as to achieve an approximate 
variogram model, while maintaining a minimum number of pairs in each bin. A rule of thumb 
is at least 30 pairs per bin. (Chiles and Delfiner 1999)  
To compute kriging estimates, we will need the covariances among all points and between each 
of the observed points and the point to be predicted. The usual way to obtain these is through a 
covariance function, such as the commonly used exponential covariance function. The 
exponential variogram has the form:  
(2.18) 
where: a = nugget effect, r = range, and 𝜎2 = sill or variance where there is no correlation
present, i.e. the maximum of γ(h) in Figure 2.1. The corresponding exponential covariance 
function has the form: 
(2.19) 
Ordinary Kriging gives us the unbiased linear estimator for the unknown value at point 𝒔0 
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?̂?0 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑍𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
𝑫 = [
𝐶10
⋮
𝐶𝑁0
] 
𝜎𝐸
2 = 𝐸 {(𝑍0(𝒔) − 𝑍0̂(𝒔))
2
} = 𝐶00 + 𝒘
𝑇𝑪𝒘 − 2𝒘𝑇𝑫
ℒ = 𝐶00 + 𝒘
𝑇𝑪𝒘 − 2𝒘𝑇𝑫 + 2𝜆(𝒘𝑇𝟏 − 1)
(2.20) 
where ∑ 𝑤𝑖 = 1
𝑁
𝑖=1 . Using the covariance function, let 
(2.21) 
Using this, the mean squared error expression can be written 
(2.22) 
Equation 2.22 is minimized under the constraint that 𝒘𝑇𝟏 = 1 using the Lagrange optimization
method. Introducing the Lagrange multiplier −2𝜆 and minimizing  
(2.23) 
we eventually get the solution for the kriging weights 𝒘 = 𝑪−1[𝑫 − 𝜆𝟏]. Similarly, the
minimized Ordinary kriging variance is 𝜎𝑖
2 = 𝐶00 − 𝒘𝐶0𝑖 + 𝜆. It shows that the kriging
variance increases with lower weighted covariances 𝒘𝐶0𝑖 between sampled points and the point 
to interpolate 𝒔0. (Chiles and Delfiner 1999) The kriging variance shows the uncertainty 
associated with the interpolated temperature estimates, but also indicates in relative terms 
whether an interpolated location is near or far away from sampled locations. This is a useful 
property for my purposes because theory shows that geographic basis risk in WI insurance is 
higher when distances between weather stations are larger (Dalhaus 2018). This means that I 
can use the kriging variance as a proxy for geographic basis risk. My approach introduces a few 
improvements to Woodard and Garcia (2008): First it has potential for much higher resolution. 
Woodard and Garcia extrapolate temperature measurements at one location in each of nine crop 
reporting districts in Illinois. Meanwhile, kriging can be performed on a high-resolution grid 
where limits are only set by computing power. Even with very modest computing resources, I 
can estimate temperatures at 62,833 five square kilometer areas. Second, my method offers a 
straight-forward way to create geographic basis risk-adjusted WI contracts using the kriging 
variance. Finally, my method is easy to automate and the same approach can quite simply be 
applied to other states or even countries using the same framework.  
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3 Data 
“There are three kinds of lies: Lies, damn lies, and statistics” 
- (popularized by) Twain, M.
For the empirical part of this thesis I use exclusively publicly available data from three sources. 
Temperature data from Illinois weather stations is obtained from the ‘Daily Summaries’ dataset 
provided by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) of the United 
States. Data on annual corn yields were obtained from annual surveys provided by National 
Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) in the US Department of Agriculture. Finally, the 
geographic boundary shapefile of Illinois, the coordinate reference system, and projection 
datum were downloaded from the US Census Bureau. All data manipulation, statistical 
estimation, simulations and plots were made using the R language within RStudio. Code and 
data are available upon request to promote replication.  
3.1 Temperature data 
Daily temperature data where obtained from the NOAA ‘Daily Summaries’ dataset which 
includes daily measurements of minimum, maximum and average temperatures over 24-hour 
cycles measured at ground level at weather stations. The temperature is supplied in degrees 
Fahrenheit and was not converted to Celsius. Daily summaries were downloaded from May 1st 
through September 31st based on estimates for the growing season of corn in Illinois (USDA 
2010). Since I am interested in estimating the impact of extreme heat, I am not interested in 
nighttime temperatures and only maximum temperature over the 24-hour cycle was chosen. 
Following Annan and Schlenker (2015) I consider extreme heat to be degree days over 29 
degrees Celsius or 84 degrees Fahrenheit. However, to more easily reference previous work on 
temperature interpolation (Holdaway 1996; Nguyen et al. 2015; Cronqvist 2018) I do not 
transform degrees Fahrenheit to degree days until after kriging interpolation has been 
performed.  
Temperatures over the growing season for all stations where then averaged by station to get 
mean temperatures over the growing season for each station. This was done for four years; 
2017, 2016, 2012, and 2011. Two sets of sequential years (2016, 2017) and (2011, 2012) were 
chosen to perform two insurance simulations. The first is based on 2017 data where expected 
payout is calculated from previous year’s payout (2016) and similarly again with 2012 and 
2011. The 2017 data included measurements from 135 weather stations, 2016; 136, 2012; 152, 
and 158 for 2011. Each station has a unique name and so the merge-function in R was used to 
perform an inner join by station name such that the data for all the different years consist of the 
same stations.  
This resulted in 126 common stations. Each station 𝑖 for 𝑖 ∈ 1, … ,126 is associated with a mean 
degree day value per year 𝑡, a latitude and a longitude. The coordinates were used to transform 
the data table into a data frame of spatial points. In Figure 3.1 all stations are displayed on a 
map of Illinois. The stations were relatively evenly distributed geographically. Effective kriging 
interpolation requires that pairs of stations can be found for a wide range of different distances 
between the pair. A relatively dense sample of observations ensures that a reasonably realistic 
sample variogram can be fitted.  
13 
The temperature data largely followed a normal distribution (see Appendix 2) and ranged 
between about 70 degrees and 90 degrees Fahrenheit. The hottest season was in 2012 with an 
average temperature of 84 degrees F across the five months. The coolest was 2017 with an 
average temperature of 80,7 degrees F. 2012 was the third hottest summer on record in Illinois 
(NOAA 2019) since records began in 1873 (the first were 1955 and 1995) which made it an 
interesting robustness check to see how our insurance contract performs under relatively 
extreme heat conditions.  
Exploratory analysis of the temperature data reveals some apparent outliers. Consider the plot 
3.1 (b) of observed temperatures at the 126 stations for the growing season 2017. Two stations 
(USC00118186 at latitude 39,84, longitude -89,63 and USC00116910 at latitude 40,88, 
longitude -88,63) have much lower temperature values than neighbouring stations, both at 70 
degrees while the immediate surrounding area uniformly shows temperatures above 80 degrees. 
Similar observations were made for only one station in the 2016 data set. 2017 outliers are 
shown in red circles on figure 3.1. No outliers were spotted in the 2011 and 2012 data. Recall 
from chapter 2.4 that variogram modelling relies on the assumption that covariances are higher 
between neighbouring sites than between distant sites. Outlier values at a particular site 
therefore skew the estimates for all neighbouring sites by fitting an incorrect variogram model 
to the pairwise variances. I solved this issue by replacing the three outliers with averages of 
observed values at the two nearest stations. Another option would have been to simply remove 
the outliers, but a priority was set to preserve sample size when possible.  
Figure 3-1 Station sample 
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I also referenced historical local weather reports to ensure that outliers were not the result of 
some extreme localized event (Illinois State Water survey 2017; 2016). In any case it is 
unrealistic to expect average temperatures across a five-month period to differ more than 10 
degrees within a 10 km radius. I therefore feel justified in my approach. A digital elevation 
model (DEV) was not used for temperature prediction. The average elevation of Illinois is 180 
meters above sea level and is very flat, with first and third quartiles only differing by 40 meters. 
(NOAA 2017) Previous research suggests that elevation does not strongly correlate with 
temperature at those altitudes (Cronqvist 2018).  
3.2 Corn yield data 
Data on corn yields were downloaded from the USDA NASS ad-hoc Quick Stats online search 
tool, providing users with free access to .csv-files of annual surveys conducted by NASS. The 
Agricultural Yield survey provides farmer reported survey data of expected crop yields used to 
forecast and estimate crop production levels throughout the growing season. Farm operators 
provide data for small grain crops, row crops (including corn), tobacco, and hay being produced 
on the operation. Hay stocks data are also collected. Acreage planted, acreage for harvest, and 
expected yield per acre are collected from each operator for the crop of interest the first month. 
In following months, the same sample of operators are contacted to update expected yield per 
acre data. Updating reported information from the same sample of operators each month 
provides a measure of change resulting from growing conditions. Sample sizes range from 
5,500 in June to 27,000 in August. (USDA 2018) A more comprehensive survey called the 
agricultural census with larger sample sizes are conducted every five years.  
However, exploratory analysis of the census, comparing census with survey data, reveals that 
the annual version is acceptable. NASS survey data has been used in multiple previous studies, 
including Goodwin and Hungerford (2014), Annan and Schlenker (2015) and others.  It is 
however important to note that survey data is always subject to errors. Most importantly, 
samples of survey respondents may not be representative of the population of farmers.  
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Figure 3-2 Histograms of corn yields 
Yield data are supplied on a per county level, and includes 99 out of 102 counties in 2011, 
95/102 in 2012, 96/102 in 2016 and 100 out of 102 in 2017. Data sets were merged by county 
name to ensure the same sample for all years. Exploratory analysis of the yield data reveals that 
their distributions differ between years. For example, in 2017 yields ranged between 120 and 
250 bushels per acre (bu/ac) or 4,000 square meters, with a mean of 190,6 bu/ac. One bushel of 
corn grains is approximately 25,4 kilograms. In 2012, yields ranged between 14 bu/ac and 180 
bu/ha, with a mean of 91,4. Corn is the most intensely farmed crop in Illinois, followed by 
soybeans, and is grown across the entire state. Because of the importance of corn as a staple in 
US agriculture, its dependency on weather and other variables has been studied before.  
In a comprehensive study of 2,000 US counties for 54 years between 1950 and 2004, Schlenker 
and Roberts (2006) show that corn yield follows a nonlinear trend with regards to temperatures. 
Between 10 and 25 degrees Celsius, corn yield and temperature are positively correlated. 
However, beyond 25 degrees, the relationship reverts to a negative contribution from 
temperatures on yield. Beyond 30 degrees, the effect is very significant and just one day of 38 
degrees (100 degrees F) will lower annual yields by 5% on average. Such temperatures and 
beyond were measured in 1200 instances across 152 weather stations in Illinois in 2012, the 
warmest year in our data set. Figure 3.2 also shows that yields were on average considerably 
lower that year.   
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3.3 Geographic boundary data 
The geographic boundary shapefile of Illinois was downloaded from the US Census Bureau, 
which could be read into RStudio using the readOGR-function which is used to load spatial 
objects. The state of Illinois boundaries was then used as a template to create a grid of 5 square 
kilometer (5000m x 5000m) pixels that cover the entire area of Illinois. This resulted in 62,833 
pixels to interpolate over. When choosing a pixel size, one has to make a trade-off between 
high resolution and reasonable computing speed. Because the kriging algorithm works 
sequentially across the whole grid, more pixels lead to lower computing speed and kriging may 
become prohibitively expensive when the size or resolution of the grid are too high (Park et al. 
2018). 
Knowledge of the data to interpolate can help guide decisions about the resolution. We know 
that surface temperature is generally not subject to very local variation but in Illinois mainly a 
latitude trend with increasing temperatures in the north-south direction. (Wallace and Hobbs 
2006, p. 391) Large urban areas may be warmer on average than less populated areas due to 
human activity such as modification of land surfaces and radiative forcing due to air pollution. 
This so-called urban heat island effect is generally more noticeable for nighttime temperatures 
than daytime temperatures. (ibid. p. 411) The main urban center of Illinois (Chicago) is much 
larger than 5 square kilometers. I therefore conclude the choice of 5km x 5km pixels for the 
purposes of kriging interpolation is appropriate. 
3.1.1 Projection and coordinate system 
When mapping sufficiently small areas, it is 
acceptable to approximate the Earth as flat. For 
small-scale maps, those that encompass a large 
area, we must consider the Earth’s shape.  The 
assumption that the Earth is round or spherical does 
not accurately represent it.  The Earth’s constant 
spinning causes it to bulge slightly along the 
equator, ruining its perfect spherical shape. 
Creating a 2D map from a 3D shape is impossible 
without introducing some error. Figure 3.3 shows 
three types of projections (planar, conic, and 
cylindrical) and how they pan out on a 2D map. 
Planar projection is appropriate only for mapping 
of the poles. Conic projections are very accurate 
along a given latitude, or circumference around the 
globe, where the cone ‘touches’ the Earth. This is 
good for mapping the mid latitudes. Cylindrical 
projections wrap a cylinder around the globe and 
are particularly accurate around the equator. 
(Campbell and Shin 2012) Figure 3-3 Map projection, Campbell and Shin (2012)
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For my purposes mapping a relatively small area (Illinois extends 338 km in the East-West 
direction and 628 km in the North-South direction) I am not overly concerned about choice of 
projection so long as the same one is used uniformly across our spatial datasets. Because Illinois 
extends further in latitude than in longitude, I chose the transverse Mercator projection, which 
caters well to that attribute.  
The North American Datum of 1983 (NAD83) was applied as the coordinate reference system 
(CRS) for the Illinois grid. A geodedic datum is a coordinate system and a set of reference 
points, used to locate places on the Earth. Because the Earth deviates significantly from a 
perfect ellipsoid, the ellipsoid that best approximates its shape varies region by region across 
the world. Therefore, most regions of the world used ellipsoids measured locally to best suit 
the vagaries of Earth's shape in their respective locations. While ensuring the most accuracy 
locally, this practice makes integrating and disseminating information across regions difficult. 
However, for the purposes of mapping Illinois, using NAD83 is straight-forward and obvious. 
Latitude and longitude were converted from degrees to meters using the SPTransform-function 
in R’s sp-package. Using meters instead of degrees makes the variograms much easier to 
interpret because I can see how covariances between points vary by distance in terms of meters 
and kilometers.  
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Tit = α + β1Lati + β2Loni + β3lake 
4 Method 
“See first, think later, then test. But always see first. Otherwise you will only see what you 
were expecting. Most scientists forget that.” 
- Adams, D.
Because the purpose of this thesis is to explore whether Illinois corn farmers benefit from an 
insurance contract which accounts for geographic basis risk, I need a reliable estimate of such 
risk. As described in better detail in chapter 2.4 geographic basis risk is defined here as the error 
in estimates of correlation between temperatures and crop yields that arises because temperature 
data is estimated at a weather station some distance away from the farm. The weather index 
constructed from data measured at that station is therefore only an approximation of local 
temperatures at the farm. Theory posits that this error becomes larger as distances between 
farms and stations grow larger, because the correlation between temperatures at two locations 
becomes weaker the greater the distance between the locations. As described in chapter 2.5, 
kriging interpolation estimates unknown temperatures across the whole study area from 
measured temperatures at a sample of locations. How heavily temperatures at a particular 
sampled location is weighted in estimating an unknown location depends on the distance 
between the two. Before kriging can be performed, a variogram model must be selected to fit 
the sample variogram. I will fit three different models; exponential, spherical, and gaussian. A 
model will be selected based on leave-one-out cross-validation, where the lowest mean error 
will be selected for kriging. 
The variogram function in R plots an omnidirectional variogram, which means that distances 
in all directions in 2D space are treated the same. To perform kriging, the intrinsic hypothesis 
must be satisfied (Journel and Huigbregts 1978). The intrinsic hypothesis requires that the mean 
and the variance depend strictly on the separation distance between samples and not on the 
coordinate position of the data. When the intrinsic hypothesis is not satisfied it is because the 
data has some trend which must be removed before the data can be adequately interpolated with 
kriging (Vieira et al. 2010). I suspect that there may be directional trends in latitude or 
longitude. For example, there may be a trend towards lower temperatures as one moves 
latitudinally from south to north. In such a case the mean and variance are not independent of 
the coordinate position because the northernmost pixels will be overestimated, i.e. predicted to 
be warmer than the real temperature. We have learned from Cronqvist (2018) that altitude 
trends are not discernable in areas as flat as Illinois. Holdaway (1996) also shows a so-called 
lake trend, where summer temperatures are cooler in the immediate vicinity of a large lake or 
ocean. The north-eastern corner of Illinois borders Lake Michigan, which may impact three 
shoreline stations in our sample. Lake Michigan is the only large body of water in Illinois. Tests 
for trends can be performed via a simple linear regression. I run the following regression model: 
(4.1) 
where the Tit is the temperature at station i at year t and the explanatory variables are latitude, 
longitude, and a lake dummy. The lake dummy takes the value 1 for the three weather stations 
bordering Lake Michigan, and zero otherwise. Regression coefficients for latitude range from 
-1,17 to -1,57 for the four years in our sample, while coefficients for longitude range from -
0,15 to -0,39. Moving 10 kilometers west in the east-west direction was associated with on
average 0,01 degrees cooling. The dummy coefficient ranges between -0,9 and -2,2 which
means that summer max temperatures are on average ca 1,5 degrees F cooler immediately by
Lake Michigan.
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𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑠(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑇(𝑥, 𝑦) − ?̂?(𝑥, 𝑦)
With latitude and longitude expressed in meters, moving 10 kilometers in a north direction was 
associated with 0,04 degrees cooling on average. However, only the latitude trend is statistically 
significant for all four years. The R2-statistic is 0,73 which means that the model explains
geographic temperature variation rather well.  
In my temperature data sample, I generate a new variable containing the residuals, or error 
terms, from the regressions following Vieira et al. (2010). Because the effect sizes of the trends 
are captured in the regression coefficients β, the residuals are independent of the explanatory 
variables. As described in detail in this literature on linear detrending of spatial data, the 
detrended variables are constructed as follows (Vieira 2000; Vieira et al. 2010): 
(4.2) 
where 𝑇(𝑥, 𝑦) is the actual observed temperature at stations located at coordinates x and y, 
while ?̂?(𝑥, 𝑦) is the estimated temperatures in from the regression model. I choose to only 
account for the latitude (north-south) trend as it was the only one showing significance for all 
years. As seen in figure 4.1 there is a clear correlation between temperature and latitude. 
However, in our detrended variable the correlation is successfully removed. Therefore, I will 
fit a version of the variograms to the residual variables where the trend is removed.  
Figure 4-1 : Scatterplot of latitude versus temperature (above) and residuals (below) 
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As figure 4.1 shows, the residuals are decoupled from the latitude, and have a mean centred 
around zero. I create sample variograms both for the original temperature variables and the 
detrended variables. I then fit three different types of models to our sample variograms. 
Following Cronqvist (2018) and Vieira (2010) I fit an exponential model, a spherical model 
and a gaussian model. The exponential model increases more sharply close to zero distance, 
and then continues to strictly increase but flattens out until it reaches its sill at a distance where 
there is no longer any covariance between locations. The spherical model is similar in shape 
but reaches its sill earlier than the exponential function. This model also actually reaches the 
sill, while the exponential model merely approaches it. Hence, the exponential model is 
appropriate in cases where two locations of data are never completely decoupled, even when 
the distance between them is very large. The spherical model is more appropriate when you 
assume the covariance between the two to eventually reach zero. The gaussian model, in 
contrast, initially has a negligible slope at low distances which later increases, and then tapers 
off again approaching the sill. (Christakos 1992; Cronqvist 2018) 
I fit the variogram models using the fit.variogram- and vgm-functions from the gstat-package 
in R. These functions automatically select nugget variance, range and sill to fit the model as 
close as possible with the data. It also selects the bin size to ensure that each bin contains at 
least 30 station pairs. I do this for all three model types, and both observed temperatures and 
detrended temperature residuals. Variogram plots are presented in Appendix 2. To decide on 
model selection we will perform leave-one-out cross-validation on how kriging would perform 
with the different models. Leave-one-out cross-validation works by separating the sample into 
a single observation as the validation set and the remaining observations as the training set. 
Since kriging predicts unknown temperatures at a set of locations based on observed 
temperatures at sampled locations, the accuracy of the kriging model can be measured by 
removing one observed location and compare the estimated value at that location with the 
observed value. This can be done for every observation in the sample. Put simply, this is what 
leave-one-out cross-validation is doing. (James et al. 2015, p. 192) I want to select the model 
for which the mean square error between estimated and observed values is the lowest, a measure 
of model accuracy. 
Table 4-1 Leave-one-out cross-validation for model selection 
Model Year MSE Detrended MSE 
Exponential 2011 1.265 1.285 
Exponential 2012 1.097 1.853 
Exponential 2016 2.078 2.827 
Exponential 2017 1.975 3.356 
Spherical 2011 1.261 6.547 
Spherical 2012 1.099 1.831 
Spherical 2016 2.077 2.764 
Spherical 2017 1.974 3.889 
Gaussian 2011 1.241 1.250 
Gaussian 2012 1.164 5.522 
Gaussian 2016 2.219 4.161 
Gaussian 2017 2.169 3.925 
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As shown in figure 4.2, the best performing model for the original temperature variable is a 
spherical model. The same conclusion is reached in Cronqvist (2018) for temperature kriging 
in Sweden. That I replicate their results in another country with a different data sample suggests 
that I have successfully captured a physical relationship. For the detrended variable, the 
exponential model is a better fit. To explore whether the results of our economic analysis remain 
robust for both the original and detrended data, I will estimate a set of WI insurance contracts 
for both.  
Using the two selected models from cross-validation, I perform kriging as described in chapter 
2.4. The result is interpolated temperature fields at 62,833 locations with size five square 
kilometers for each of the four growing seasons. Each temperature field is associated with its 
respective kriging variance. 
Figure 4-2 Interpolated maximum temperatures (degrees F) over the growing season using ordinary kriging. Spherical 
model with original temperature values. 
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Figure 4.2 shows that northern Illinois is cooler than the southern part of the state, and it also 
shows once again that the growing season of 2012 is the hottest out of the four. The kriging 
variance heat maps in figure 4.3 are somewhat difficult to interpret, but a comparison with the 
map of station locations in figure 3.1 reveals that variances are higher in areas where the density 
of stations is lower. Consider for example the whiter area in the mid-latitudes, towards the 
western part of the state: Kriging variance is somewhat higher here compared to the surrounding 
areas in blue. This corresponds to an area in figure 3.1 approximately at (-90.5, 40) where there 
is a lack of stations. As discussed in chapter 2.5, kriging variance is higher when distances to 
stations are higher.  
Next, I convert our interpolated temperature values into degree days over 84 degrees F (or 29 
degrees Celsius). Here, we follow Annan and Schlenker (2015) and Schlenker and Roberts 
(2006) where 84 degrees is the temperature where negative impacts on corn are noticeable.  
 Figure 4-3 Kriging variances; Spherical model with regular temperature field 
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?̂?(𝜏) = argmin
𝛽∈ℝ
(𝜏 ∗ ∑ |𝑦𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖
𝑇𝛽| + (1 − 𝜏) ∗ ∑ |𝑦𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖
𝑇𝛽|
𝑦𝑖<𝑥𝑖
𝑇𝛽𝑦𝑖≥𝑥𝑖
𝑇𝛽
) 
The degree day index will take the value 0 whenever temperature at a particular location and 
year is below 84 degrees. Temperature fields were converted into degree days using the 
following function: 
DD_converter <- function(TMAX){ 
DD <- pmax((TMAX - 84), 0) 
return(DD) 
} 
where the function pmax simply returns the larger of two values; temperature in Fahrenheit 
minus 84, or 0. Next, I want to estimate the effect of heat on crop yields to determine the WI 
insurance strike level. Following Conradt et al. (2015) and Dalhaus (2018) a quantile linear 
regression (QR) model is used. QR, which can be regarded as an extension of the basic OLS 
(Koenker and Bassett 1978). It defers the focus away from the conditional mean to the 
conditional median or any other quantile of interest. The conditional QR model leads to the 
following minimization problem: 
(4.3) 
QR minimizes the sum of absolute residuals, which are asymmetrically weighted. The 
weighting factor depends on the sign of the residuals: positive residuals receive a weighting 
factor of τ, negative residuals are weighted by (1- τ). There are two important differences 
between the OLS and QR estimator. First, the OLS estimator relies on squared deviations 
whereas the QR estimator uses absolute value of deviations. Second, QR speciﬁes a weighting 
factor τ, while OLS gives equal weights. With respect to the second property, for QR it is 
possible to characterize the entire conditional yield distribution and to specify any 
predetermined position, since in the QR framework β is a function of τ, β(τ) with τ ∈ (0,1). This 
is an advantage with regard to insurance solutions since the differential impact of x (here the 
weather index WI) on y may be analyzed and τ may be set in such a way to be consistent with 
the research interest.  
For insurance solutions, the interest lies in the tails and QR is more efﬁcient in representing the 
tail dependency than a mean-based estimator such as OLS. (Conradt et al. 2015) QR is also less 
sensitive to non-normal distributions and outliers which makes it easier to use than OLS. 
Following Condradt et al. (2015) and Dalhaus (2018) I select τ = 0.3 for the insurance contracts 
which means that I look at the effect size of degree days on yields at the third decile of the yield 
distribution. Figure 4.4 shows QR plots for the four years, with the log of corn yield as the 
dependent variable and degree days as the explanatory variable. τ is plotted along the x-axis 
and so 4.4 shows how the effect size of heat on corn yields vary along the yield distribution. 
With the exception of 2011, the damage from heat is worse towards the left tail of the yield 
distribution, implying that areas where corn yields are low hurt more from an increase in 
temperature. Coefficients at τ = 0.3 range from -0.1 to -0.35 which means that one additional 
degree over 84° F in average temperature over the growing season is associate   with a 10-30% 
decrease in end-of-year corn yields. The effect size of heat on corn yields are largest in 2012 
which is also the hottest year in the data set. 
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𝑤𝑖𝑡 = 𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖𝑡 − 𝜑𝑖𝑡 
I then proceed to calculate the outcomes of the WI insurance contracts following the theoretical 
framework developed in chapter 2.3. I begin by running quantile regressions for the third decile 
following Conradt et al. and Dalhaus. I will calculate insurance outcomes both for contracts 
based on a regular temperature index and a degree day (over 84 degrees) index. The strike level 
is then calculated by plugging in the Illinois-wide average yield into the inverse linear 
regression function 𝑆 = 𝑔−1(?̅?) so that the strike level S equal the degree days for which the
expected yield is the average yield. The WI insurance payout is determined by the following 
function: 
(4.4) 
where T is the ticksize, or regression coefficient. The intuition is that the marginal impact on 
yield per degree hotter temperature times the number of degrees above the strike level equals 
the expected yield loss. If the index is lower than the strike level, payout is zero.  
Recall from chapter 2.2 and 2.3 that the risk neutral insurer sets the premium equal to expected 
payouts. For simplicity expected payout is assumed to be equal to last year’s payout. Therefore, 
the premium in 2017 is set as equal to the calculated payout based on the 2016 data, and the 
premium in 2012 is equal to the 2011 payout. Following Dalhaus (2018) I calculate terminal 
wealth as follows: 
(4.5) 
where y is the realized corn yield, δ is the WI insurance payout and φ is the insurance premium. 
Figure 4-4 Quantile Regression output: yield~temperature, yield deciles on x-axis 
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𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑊𝐼 + 𝛽2𝜎𝑂𝐾
2
The geographic basis risk adjusted contract is contract is constructed in a very similar way to 
the regular contract. However, the inverse function 𝑔−1 from which to solve the strike level
now has two variables; the average yield and the kriging variance. The regression now has the 
following form: 
(4.6) 
Including the kriging variance means that the strike level will better contain the information on 
how much the weather index itself contributes to corn yields.  
For the utility calculations, I choose an isoelastic utility function which exhibits CRRA and 
DARA. Such a utility function, introduced formally in chapter 2.1, has empirical justification 
in the literature (Dalhaus 2018). I calculate utilities for each of 62,833 hypothetical farms, each 
of a size of five square kilometers. Utilities were calculated for different degrees of risk 
aversion, where the Arrow-Pratt measurement of risk aversion (α in chapter 2.1) increases from 
0 to 1.0 in increments of 0.2. I do this to see how the expected utility of our WI insurance 
contracts changes with changes in risk aversion. I test the hypothesis that the terminal wealth 
of a farmers purchasing the basis risk adjusted contract are on average better off than those 
purchasing the regular contract.  
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5 Analysis and discussion 
“Not explaining science seems to me perverse. When you’re in love, 
you want to tell the world” 
- Sagan, C
In analyzing the results, there are essentially three comparisons to make: First, to compare the 
results for two different years 2017 and 2012, where the latter is a historically very hot year. 
Comparing the two years may give insight into how the geographic basis risk adjusted contract 
performs relative to the regular contract under extreme heat conditions. Second, to compare the 
degree day over 84° F index with the regular temperature index. Third, to compare how the 
geographic basis risk adjusted contract performs based on detrended variances with how it 
performs without any detrending. 
Throughout this section, I will refer to the regular WI insurance without basis risk adjustment 
as Contract 1, while the geographic basis risk adjusted contract is called Contract 2. I look at 
terminal wealth for each contract and underlying index, then I will analyze utilities under 
various degrees of risk aversion for the most attractive contract.  
Table 5-1 Terminal wealth for farmers at the end of the 2017 season, Temperature Index. 
Contract 1st Quartile Median Mean 3rd Quartile 
No insurance 181.7 202.6 196.6 215.8 
Contract 1 177.6 201.8 194.8 217.7 
Contract 2 177.8 202.1 195.0 217.8 
Contract 2 detrended 177.1 201.0 193.7 216.5 
Table 5-2  Terminal wealth for farmers at the end of the 2012 season, Temperature Index. 
Contract 1st Quartile Median Mean 3rd Quartile 
No insurance 77.4 104.2 98.9 123.6 
Contract 1 94.6 110.2 109.3 125.4 
Contract 2 94.5 110.6 109.5 125.6 
Contract 2 detrended 93.3 111.3 109.3 125.0 
With the regular temperature index, Contract 2 is an improvement over Contract 1 both in 2017 
and 2012. However, purchasing insurance at all only increases farmers’ wealth in 2012. 
Contracts based on the detrended temperature variance were generally not an improvement over 
a non-detrended Contract 2. 
Table 5-3 Terminal wealth for farmers at the end of the 2017 season, Degree Day Index. 
Contract 1st Quartile Median Mean 3rd Quartile 
No insurance 181.7 202.6 196.6 215.8 
Contract 1 177.3 202.6 194.9 220.0 
Contract 2 177.7 202.7 194.9 219.8 
Contract 2 detrended 177.8 202.9 194.7 219.3 
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Table 5-4 Terminal wealth for farmers at the end of the 2012 season, Degree Day Index. 
Contract 1st Quartile Median Mean 3rd Quartile 
No insurance 77.4 104.2 98.9 123.6 
Contract 1 94.2 108.9 108.9 123.7 
Contract 2 93.5 108.6 108.5 122.8 
Contract 2 detrended 93.3 108.3 108.3 122.7 
Tables 5.3 and 5.4 show the terminal wealth of purchasing WI insurance where the underlying 
index is degree days over 84° F. Similar to the ordinary temperature index, farmers only benefit 
from buying any of the contracts in 2012. That this result remains across two different 
underlying index constructions suggests that temperature index insurance is desirable when the 
growing season is expected to be hotter than last year, as the payout is then more likely to be 
higher than the premium. When considering mean terminal wealth, farmers benefit from the 
geographic basis risk adjusted contract over the regular contract only when the underlying index 
is a normal temperature index. However, for the degree day index, accounting for geographic 
basis risk does not seem to improve the wealth position of farmers on average. Once again, 
detrending the temperature variable does not result in any improvement in terms of wealth.  
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show the difference in terminal wealth from holding insurance contract 2 
versus no insurance for all theoretical 5x5 km farms in 2012 and 2017. Given my choice to set 
premiums equal to last year’s payout, the results make sense: In 2012, which was hotter than 
2011, farms in the hotter southern part of the state benefit more from heat protection. In 2017, 
which was cooler than the previous year, southern farms face relatively higher premiums and 
suffer a loss from buying insurance.  
Figure 5-2 Wealth difference Insurance 
vs. No insurance 2012 
Figure 5-1 Wealth difference Insurance 
vs. No insurance 2017 
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Below are utility calculations for 2017 and 2012 using the regular temperature indices and a 
range of risk aversion coefficients: 
Table 5-5 Utilities for no insurance, contract 1 and contract 2 for various levels of risk  aversion 2017; 0 risk 
neutral, 1 very risk averse. 
α 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 
U(0) 195.5 84.1 37.9 18.1 9.4 5.3 
U(C1) 193.8 83.4 37.6 18.0 9.4 5.3 
U(C2) 193.9 83.5 37.6 18.0 9.3 5.3 
Table 5-6 Utilities for no insurance, contract 1 and contract 2 for various levels of risk 2012  aversion; 0 risk 
neutral, 1 very risk averse. 
α 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 
U(0) 76.4 39.3 21.0 11.7 6.9 4.3 
U(C1) 108.3 51.9 23.8 12.9 7.4 4.5 
U(C2) 108.5 52.0 26.0 13.7 7.7 4.7 
Analysis of utility outcomes for various degrees of risk aversion reveals that for years when 
realized crop damages are low, the gain or loss in utility from buying insurance is minimized 
when risk aversion is very high. In a year with little crop damage, risk neutral farmers will not 
buy insurance, while highly risk averse farmers will be indifferent between buying and not 
buying insurance. In years with heat-related high damages, purchasing temperature index 
insurance results in realized utility improvements for all levels of risk aversion. The basis risk 
adjusted contract is also an improvement in all cases, and the improvement is more significant 
when risk aversion is high.  
This result is can be theoretically motivated by recalling that accounting for geographic basis 
risk is supposed to decrease the variability in insurance payouts and better capture how heat 
affects crop yields. However, our results also show that switching from Contract 1 to Contract 
2 was only preferred when the underlying index was the regular temperature index. No 
improvement in terminal wealth or utility was detected for a degree day index when switching 
from contract 1 (regular) to contract 2 (basis risk adjusted). I did not manage to isolate a cause 
for this result, but it is conceivable that errors were introduced when extreme daily temperatures 
were averaged out across five months into a growing season index. Taking an average of 
temperatures in degree Fahrenheit would contain less information loss.  
A further weakness in the study design involve the assumption that expected payouts equal 
previous year’s payouts. More likely, insurers base their payout expectations on an average of 
multiple prior years, and trends like climate change are also likely taken into account when 
setting premiums year on year. This assumption was made mainly to cut down time spend on 
data processing. I consider this a drawback for the reliability of my comparison between 
insurance and no insurance, and one of the first things I would extend upon given more time 
and resources. Interested readers should consult other papers on pricing of weather derivates 
such as Goodwin and Hungerford (2014), Conradt et al. (2015) and Park et al. (2019). However, 
my result indicate with some confidence that the basis risk-adjusted contract remains an 
improvement over the regular contract.  
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5.1 Sample size sensitivity 
As was shown in chapter 2.5, the kriging predictions rely on a sufficient number of observation 
pairs (≥30) for each distance at which the semivariance is to be calculated. This means that 
there is a minimum sample size of weather stations for which the kriging method is applicable. 
To check the robustness of my results with a smaller sample size, I took a random sample of 63 
stations from my original dataset of 126 stations, which is half the initial number of stations. I 
then ran the code again with this smaller sample.  
Table 5-7 LOOCV for model selection; half sample size 
Model Year MSE  MSE (N=63) 
Exponential 2011 1.265 1.162 
Exponential 2012 1.097 1.142 
Exponential 2016 2.078 1.646 
Exponential 2017 1.975 1.764 
Spherical 2011 1.261 1.167 
Spherical 2012 1.099 1.145 
Spherical 2016 2.077 1.635 
Spherical 2017 1.974 1.765 
Gaussian 2011 1.241 1.362 
Gaussian 2012 1.164 1.312 
Gaussian 2016 2.219 1.631 
Gaussian 2017 2.169 2.124 
Leave-one-out cross validation shows mean squared errors consistent with those for the full 
sample. Curiously MSEs for some models are marginally lower than for the full sample, 
indicating higher predictive accuracy. However, the differences are generally small and not 
consistent. Once again I choose a spherical model.   
Table 5-8 Terminal wealth 2017; half sample size 
Contract 1st Quartile Median Mean 3rd Quartile 
No insurance 181.7 202.6 196.6 215.8 
Contract 1 177.6 201.8 194.8 217.7 
Contract 1: N=63 176.5 201.7 193.3 215.6 
Contract 2 177.8 202.1 195.0 217.8 
Contract 2: N=63 178 203.7 195.2 220.1 
Table 5-9 Terminal wealth 2012; half sample size 
Contract 1st Quartile Median Mean 3rd Quartile 
No insurance 77.4 104.2 98.9 123.6 
Contract 1 94.6 110.2 109.3 125.4 
Contract 1: N=63 94.6 110.4 109.5 125.3 
Contract 2 94.5 110.6 109.5 125.6 
Contract 2: N=63 94.5 110 109.4 125.4 
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Tables 5.8 and 5.9 display terminal wealth for the years 2017 and 2012 using the reduced 
sample size of stations as compared with the full sample. With the full sample, switching from 
contract 1 to 2 improves wealth marginally on average both in 2017 and 2012. However, with 
the reduced 63-station sample, switching represents an improvement only in 2017.  
Assessing the sensitivity of my kriging method for WI insurance design to sample size is 
important to rate the universality of this approach. The United States and other high-income 
countries have high densities of weather stations. However, in lower income countries in South 
America, Central Asia and North Africa, the number of stations can be lower (Gubler et al. 
2017). In rural areas of low-income countries, formal insurance markets are typically 
incomplete and often nonexistent. This is particularly true for insurance that protects against 
crop production shortfalls or livestock mortality. A common reason for insurance market failure 
is the lack of effective legal systems to enforce insurance contracts (Barnett et al. 2008). These 
issues make the benefits of WI insurance particularly important in low-income countries, but 
the method laid out here only works if the availability of weather stations ensures reasonably 
accurate weather predictions.  
31 
6. Conclusions
In this thesis I have attempted to put forward a framework for contract design of temperature 
index crop insurance which accounts for geographic basis risk. I have used a kriging 
interpolation technique to extend work in Woodard and Garcia (2008) and Dalhaus (2018) on 
the issue on basis risk in WI insurance. The kriging variance is the error in prediction of spatial 
data that arises from distances between observations and unknown locations. The purpose was 
to explore how accounting for this variance – the geographic basis risk - in WI insurance can 
produce more attractive insurance contracts. My framework has yielded some success in 
improving farmers’ economic outcomes from insuring against damages from extreme heat. My 
results have shown that while the basis risk adjusted contract was an improvement over the 
regular contract, WI insurance was overall desirable only for the hotter of the two years in my 
study. As one might suspect, the utility gain from not insuring during a low-damage year 
disappeared for the most risk-averse theoretical farmers in my simulation. To further explore 
the viability of large-scale WI insurance, research into the risk attitudes of farmers, particularly 
regarding weather risk, will be useful. My analysis is quite rudimentary and more detailed study 
is required to draw conclusions with more certainty. In particular, future research ought to 
explore how the economics of these WI markets change when premium setting is more refined 
than the simplified model I use here. Not only based on richer data on past damages, but also 
predictions about future risks. 
Still, I can say with some confidence that markets ought to further examine the potential of 
geostatistical techniques in pricing weather derivatives. My method has provided some support 
to the theoretical discussion on geographic basis risk management, but also practical 
application. Having shown that kriging interpolation is a viable way to design WI contracts 
means that it can be applied in a wide variety of settings. In the United States, crop insurance 
is sold in a federal program managed by the USDA Risk Management Agency. India also has 
a government program. However, in many developing countries high transaction and 
monitoring costs for traditional insurance make potential innovations even more important. 
While characterized by lower transaction and monitoring costs, WI insurance depends on 
weather stations to construct indices and these may be lacking in developing countries. My 
robustness checks with a smaller sample of stations are inconclusive, but the results indicate a 
reduction in wealth improvement. This is a potential challenge to WI insurance adoption, which 
given the benefits of WI options warrants further study.  
I argue that I have found a promising angle in to branch out the literature on improving WI 
insurance, and that future research may have important economic benefits in a world where 
climate may be an increasing threat to food security. If the issues with data availability I have 
just discussed can be addressed, competitive WI contracts may prove particularly useful in 
regions where agricultural production is not only more vulnerable, but monitoring costs 
associated with traditional insurance also much higher.  
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Appendix 1: More on risk aversion 
A decision-maker is a risk averter (or exhibits risk aversion) if for any lottery F the degenerate 
lottery that yields the amount ∫ 𝑤 𝑑𝐹(𝑤) with certainty is at least as good as the lottery F itself. 
If the decision-maker is always indifferent between these two lotteries, we say that he is risk 
neutral. We say that he is strictly risk averse if he is indifferent only and only if the two lotteries 
are the same, i.e. the yield w of F is also certain (degenerate).  
Equation a: Jensen's Inequality 
∫ 𝑈(𝑤)𝑑𝐹(𝑤) ≤ 𝑈 (∫ 𝑤𝑑𝐹(𝑤))  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐹 
Equation a is known as Jensen’s Inequality (Mas-Colell 1995) and is the defining property of a 
concave function. Hence, we see that risk aversion is equivalent to the concavity of U. This also 
means that risk neutrality implies linearity of U in w. Strict concavity means then that the 
marginal utility of wealth is decreasing. Hence, at any level of wealth the utility gain from an 
extra dollar is smaller than (the absolute value of) the utility of having a dollar less. It follows 
that the bet of losing a dollar or winning a dollar with equal probability is not worth taking.  
Figure 0-1 CARA utility curve (black) versus risk neutral utility curve (red). 
In the above figure we consider a gamble where your initial wealth is $1 and you play to either 
win $0.5 or lose $0.5 with equal probability. The von Neumann-Morgenstern utility (recall 
chapter 2.1) of taking the bet 1 2⁄ (0.4) + 1 2⁄ (0.8) = 0.6 is strictly lower than that of the 
initial certain position of $1. However, once you consider the risk neutral (non-concave) utility 
function in red, you notice that the risk neutral player would be indifferent between gambling 
and not gambling.  
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Appendix 2: Plots 
Temperature distributions 
37 
Sample variograms 
38 
39 
Detrended kriging variance 
40 
Utility distribution 2012: No insurance 
41 
Utility distribution 2012: Contract 1 
42 
Utility distribution 2012: Contract 2 (geographic basis risk 
adjusted) 
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Geographic trends 
Geographic Trend Regression 
========================================================================= 
 Dependent variable: 
 ------------------------------------------ 
 T11  T12  T16  T17 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Lat -1.552***  -1.511***  -1.151*** -1.462***
(0.069)    (0.067)    (0.087)   (0.086)
Lon -0.329** -0.121 -0.326**  -0.328**
(0.099) (0.096)  (0.125)  (0.124)  
lake -1.083 -0.954 -1.278 -2.183***
 (0.669)  (0.645) (0.842) (0.833)
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Observations  126  126  126  126 
R2  0.819  0.819  0.622  0.733 
Adjusted R2  0.815  0.814  0.613  0.726 
Residual Std. Error (df = 122)  1.096  1.057  1.380  1.366 
F Statistic (df = 3; 122)  184.547*** 183.898*** 66.980*** 111.614*** 
========================================================================= 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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Half size station sample (N = 63) 
